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Executive	summary
  Competition law comprises the sets of rules maintained by governments to outlaw 
or restrict anti-competitive practices. Such practices include agreements or arrangements 
between two or more people or enterprises that contain provisions that substantially lessen 
competition or increase dominance in a market, including by mergers or acquisitions, 
are exclusionary, in preventing or limiting dealings with a rival, or fix prices, volumes or 
other terms of trade amongst competitors. They also include unilateral behaviour by a 
person or enterprise to take advantage of market power for an anti-competitive purpose 
or to set the minimum price at which goods are supplied by the person or enterprise or 
can be sold by others.
  Strong competition policy and law, with effective enforcement capacity, promotes 
static economic efficiency, fair and efficient markets, lower production costs and consumer 
prices, and consumer welfare and sovereignty. There is mounting evidence that strong 
competition policy also contributes substantially to the generation of dynamic efficien-
cies, higher productivity, greater innovation in the form of new high quality products and 
process technologies, and stronger economic growth and development. These benefits 
are of particular interest to developing countries and countries in transition, such as a 
number of the economies in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
  Amongst ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have 
and enforce competition laws. Fair trade and competition acts are in the process of being 
drafted in the Philippines. Malaysia is currently debating whether to introduce compe-
tition legislation. All of the ‘plus six’ countries have some form of competition law in 
place. For Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, the primary policy questions 
are whether to introduce competition polices and, if so, in what form. For the remain-
ing countries of ASEAN, the main policy questions are more whether, and if so how, to 
competItIon polIcy In asean: case studIes*2
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integrate competition policies across these countries.
  This paper is part of research into the advantages and disadvantages of introducing 
the various components of competition policy into economies in transition, including 
how these vary as a country’s level of development evolves. A companion study reviews 
international experience from the introduction of competition policies in other transition 
economies, such as in Eastern Europe, Central and South America and Asia. 
  In this paper, we investigate three sectors, the degree of competition in which is of 
particular interest internationally and in Asia — cement, telecommunications, and transport 
and logistics. We compare these sectors in a number ASEAN countries that have different 
competition policies. The main research question for these case studies is whether we 
can discern significant differences in market conditions and outcomes in countries that 
have different competition policies, including evidence of restrictive business practices 
in ASEAN countries that do not have competition laws and improved market outcomes 
in ASEAN countries that have recently introduced competition laws. The particular hy-
pothesis we seek to test is that countries with fewer barriers to market entry have more 
competitive markets and more efficient market outcomes, such as more suppliers, lower 
market concentration, more frequent supplier entry and exit and consumer switching, 
higher productivity, lower margins and lower prices.
  In assessing the case studies, we adopt the structure-conduct-performance frame-
work. This framework is founded on the principle that market performance follows from 
the structure of the market and the conduct of its participants. Competitive structural 
conditions encourage competitive conduct, through efficient incentives and signals, which 
promotes competitive and efficient performance outcomes.
  In cross-country, and indeed cross-sector, comparisons, rigorous analysis is hampered 
by the limited availability of accurate and comparable data. The evidence available is also 
somewhat circumstantial, in exploring how market structure, conduct and performance 
differ between countries at different stages in developing competition laws without proving 
a causal link. The observed differences in market conditions and outcomes might reflect 
influences other than competition laws, such as the quality of institutions conducive to 
economic activity, the government’s economic development or trade policies, or char-
acteristics or policies specific to the case study sectors. It is difficult to discern to what 
extent the presence or absence of competition laws may have contributed to the observed 
differences. 
  A crude comparison does, however, suggest some correlations, if not necessarily 
causal relationships. There are some signs of better market conditions and outcomes in 
countries where competition laws are more advanced. 
  There is quite high correlation (0.68) between competition law status and ease 3
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of economic activity generally. In the sectors investigated in this study, the correlation 
between competition law status and market conditions and outcomes is most strongly 
positive for cement output and prices, and trade freedom. There is, however, a negative 
correlation in some sectors, most noticeably for market concentration and barriers to entry 
in the telecommunications sector, excess capacity in the cement sector, and sea freight. 
  In cement, excess capacity is greater and barriers to entry lower, and therefore rated 
as more conducive to competition, in the Philippines than in Indonesia and Thailand, both 
of which have more established competition laws. Market performance in terms of output 
and prices rates lower, however, reflecting suspected price collusion. Market concentra-
tion is high in all three countries, reflecting the characteristics of cement production. In 
telecommunications, Cambodia, even without competition laws, rates better in terms of 
market concentration, barriers to entry and prices than Thailand and Vietnam, which 
both have competition laws, reflecting early liberalisation and competition in its mobile 
sector. All three countries have seen marked increases in output, as well as improvements 
in service quality. In transport and logistics, there is generally greater trade freedom in 
countries that have implemented or are developing competition laws. In contrast, in sea 
freight, Malaysia, which is considering whether to introduce competition legislation, 
rates better than Singapore and Indonesia, both of which have competition laws in force, 
reflecting its less concentrated market and more room to expand capacity.
  The overall conclusion for the case study sectors is as signalled for ease of economic 
activity more generally — that there is a high but not perfect correlation between com-
petition laws and market conditions and outcomes. Competition laws generally make a 
significant positive contribution, but are not the sole determinant of how well markets 
behave and perform. Other influences can compensate for less developed competition 
laws or detract from more developed competition laws. The implication for policy makers 
is that developing, implementing and enforcing competition laws may not be sufficient 
to achieve competitive market conditions and outcomes in all sectors, nor necessary for 
some sectors, but can generally be expected to be significantly conducive.
*This report has been prepared at the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research with 
the assistance of Brent Layton, Deborah O’Connor and Gail Dallimore, which is gratefully 
acknowledged. It was originally written as for Report to the Economic Research Institute 
for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in 2007 and has been published as an ERIA Joint 
Research Project Series 2007 No.4. It also formed the basis for a presentation by the author 
at a conference on ‘Comparative Experience in Competition Policy Reform in Australia, 
Japan and East Asia’ sponsored by the Australia-Japan Research Centre in Canberra in 
September 20084




Competition policy pertains to competition law and its enforcement. Competition law 
refers to the sets of rules maintained by governments to outlaw or restrict anti-competi-
tive practices. These practices generally include:
•  agreements or arrangements between two or more people or enterprises that contain 
provisions that:
−  substantially lessen competition or increase dominance in a market, including by 
mergers or acquisitions
−  are exclusionary, in preventing or limiting dealings with a rival
−  fix prices, volumes or other terms of trade amongst competitors
•  unilateral behaviour by a person or enterprise that:
−  takes advantage of market power for an anti-competitive purpose 
−  sets the minimum price at which goods are supplied by the person or enterprise or 
can be sold by others.
1.1	 Why	is	it	important?
Neo-classical economic theory, together with industrial organisation theory and practice, 
provide important foundations for competition policy and law.  Strong competition 
policy and law, with effective enforcement capacity, promotes static economic efficiency, 
fair and efficient markets, lower production costs and consumer prices, and consumer 
welfare and sovereignty. 
	 	There is mounting evidence that strong competition policy also contributes sub-
stantially to the generation of dynamic efficiencies, higher productivity, greater innovation 
in the form of new high quality products and process technologies, and stronger economic 
growth and development. These benefits are of particular interest to developing countries 
and countries in transition, such as a number of the economies in the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
  In addition, a well-designed and effective competition policy complements and 
supports other economic policies, including trade liberalisation, industrial development, 
promotion of innovation, increasing domestic and foreign investment and macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies. Strong competition in the domestic market prepares exporters for 
the competitive rigors of the international marketplace. Through reducing barriers to 
entry, competition policy promotes the establishment of a strong and sustainable small 6
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and medium-sized enterprise sector. In many industrialised and developing economies, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, which are almost always privately owned, play a major 
role in investment, job creation, technology development and innovation.
  Research under way at the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations 
Conference on Trade Development and other international agencies is highlighting that 
cross-country differences in living standards and growth rates are significantly related to 
country differences in institutional capacity, the protection of property rights, and fair 




Since 1980, the number of countries with competition laws has increased rapidly. Ac-
cording to the World Bank’s Director for the East Asia and Pacific Region, 100 countries 
had competition laws in 2006 and another 30 countries were in the process of drafting 
and debating competition laws. Countries with competition laws now account for more 
than 85 per cent of world trade.
  Most developing and emerging market economies did not introduce competition 
laws until the 1990s. World Bank (2002) notes that enforcement of competition laws is 
much more active and effective in industrialised countries than in countries in transition. 
This is, however, to be expected. World Bank (2002) stresses that institution building, 
including effective competition law enforcement capacity, takes time and resources. 
2.2	 Current	state	in	ASEAN
Amongst ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have and enforce 
competition laws. Fair trade and competition acts are in the process of being drafted in the 
Philippines. Malaysia is currently debating whether to introduce competition legislation. 
All of the ‘plus six’ countries have some form of competition law in place. Table 1 below 
summaries the current state of competition policy and law in these countries. 
	 Table 2 shows how these countries rank on a number of international measures of 
ease of, or impediments to, general economic activity. Across these countries, the corre-
lation coefficient between the current state of competition laws and the average ranking 
for ease of economic activity is quite high at 0.68, shown in Figure 1. 
	 This suggests that competition laws generally make a significant positive contri-
bution, but are not the sole determinant of how well markets behave and perform and, 7
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Table	1:	Current	state	of	competition	laws	in	ASEAN	plus	six
  Competition laws    Competition legislation1
   In   In 
  force  development   
ASEAN	countries 
Brunei Darussalam        Monopolies Act (1932) 
Cambodia        Law on Marks, Trade Names and Unfair    
      Competition (2002) 
Indonesia  √     Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of    
      the Year 1999, on the Prohibition of Monopolistic   
      Practices and Unfair Business Competition (1999) 
Laos        Decree on Trade Competition (2004) 
Malaysia     √	 Laws that regulate certain enterprise activities and    
      protect consumer interests:  
      Control of Supplies Act (1961 
      Companies Act (1965) 
      Hire Purchase Act (1967) 
      Trade Descriptions Act (1972) 
      Weights and Measures Act (1972) 
      Food Act (1983) 
      Direct Sales Act (1993) 
         
      Competition clauses in some sector specific laws:  
      Electricity Supply Act (1990) 
      Communication and Multimedia Act (1998) 
Myanmar          
Philippines     √	 Competition clauses in: 
      Penal Code of the Philippines (1930) 
      Civil Code (1949)  
      Act to Prohibit Monopolies and Combinations in    
      Restraint of Trade (1961) 
      Corporation Code Batas Pambansa Blg. 68   (1980) 
      Philippine Constitution (1987) 
      Price Act (1992) 
      Consumer Act (1992) 
 
      Competition clauses in some sector specific laws:   
      Securities Act (1982) 
      General Banking Act (1948) 
      Retail Trade Liberalization Act (2000) 
      Executive Orders for maritime industry, civil    
      aviation, port services, telecommunications,    
      energy, water  
Singapore   √    Competition Act (2004) 
 
      Competition clauses in some sector specific laws:   
      Telecommunications Act (1999) 
      Electricity Act (2001) 
      Gas Act (2001) 
Thailand  √     Trade Competition Act (1999) 
      Price of Goods and Services Act (1999) 
      Telecommunications Business Act (2001) 
indeed, other influences can compensate for less developed competition laws or detract 
from more developed competition laws.8
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Vietnam   √    Competition Law (2004) 
Plus	six	countries       
Australia  √     Trade Practices Act (1974) 
China  √     Anti-monopoly provisions in current laws and    
      regulations:  
      Law of the People’s Republic of China for    
      Countering Unfair Competition (1993) 
      Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
      Concerning Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy (1997) 
      Price Law of the People’s Republic of China   (1997)  
      Law of the People’s Republic of China for    
      Inviting and Submitting Tender (1999) 
 
      Competition clauses in some sector specific laws:   
      Regulations Against Unfair Competition Acts in  
      the Civil Air Transportation Market (1996) 
      Interim Provisions on Mergers and Divisions of    
      Foreign-Invested Enterprises (2001)  
      Interim Provisions on Restructuring State-owned    
      Enterprises By Utilising Foreign Investment  (2002) 
      Interim Provisions on the Mergers with and  
      Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign    
      Investors (2003) 
India  √     Monopolies and Restricted Trade Practices Act    
      (1956) 
      Consumer Protection Act (1986)  
`      Competition Act (2002) 
Japan  √     Act Concerning Prohibition of Private  
      Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade    
      (1947) 
Korea  √     Price Stabilisation Act (1973) 
      Price Stability and Fair Trade Act (1975) 
      Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (1980) 
      Fair Subcontract Transactions Act (1984) 
      Adhesion Contract Regulations Act (1986)  
      Fair Labelling and Advertising Act (1999)  
      Door-to-Door Sales Act (1991) 
      Instalment Transactions Act (1991) 
      Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act (1999)  
      Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce Act   
      (2002) 
      Fair Franchise Transactions Act (2002) 
New Zealand  √     Commerce Act (1986) 
      Fair Trading Act (1986)  
 
      Competition clauses in some sector specific laws: 
      Electricity Industry Reform Act (1998) 
      Telecommunications Act (2001)
Source:  APEC (2007), Global Competition Forum (2007), Japan Free Trade Commission (2007), 
Mehta and Pham (2007), Wada (2004)   
Note:  1 Excludes amendments9
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Table	2:	Ease	of	economic	activity	–	country	rankings
  Ease of   Index of  Economic  Competitive  Corruption   Average  
  Doing  Economic  Freedom of  ness  Perceptions  ranking 
  Business  Freedom  the World  Scoreboard  Index
Competition	laws	in	force               
Indonesia   123  110  83  54  130  100 
Singapore   1  2  2  2  5  2 
Thailand   15  50  60  33  63  44 
Vietnam   91  138  88  n/a  111  107
Competition	laws	in	development             
Malaysia   24  48  53  23  44  38 
Philippines   133  97  68  45  121  93
No	comprehensive	competition	laws             
Brunei   78  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  78 
Darussalam 
Cambodia   145  102  n/a  n/a  151  133 
Laos   164  140  n/a  n/a  111  138 
Myanmar   n/a  153  129  n/a  160  147
Plus	six	countries
Australia  9  3  11  12  9  9 
China   83  119  95  15  70  76 
India   120  104  53  27  70  75 
Japan   12  18  19  24  17  18 
Korea   30  36  35  29  42  34 
New Zealand   2  5  3  19  1  6
Source:  Fraser Institute (2006), Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal (2007), International 
Institute for Management Development (2006), Transparency International (2006), World Bank (2007) 
Note:  Ranked from low (fewer impediments) to high (more impediments)10
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3.	 Research	questions
For Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, the primary policy questions are 
whether to introduce competition polices and, if so, in what form. For the remaining 
countries of ASEAN, the main policy questions are more whether and, if so, how to 
integrate competition policies across these countries. 
  We have therefore divided research to address these questions into two parts:
•  part 1 — research into the advantages and disadvantages of introducing the various 
components of competition policy into economies in transition, including how these 
vary as a country’s level of development evolves and
•  part 2 — research into the advantages and disadvantages of the various options for 
integration of competition policy across ASEAN plus six countries.
3.1	 Introducing	competition	policy
Countries that do not currently have competition laws face the following policy ques-
tions:
Figure	1:	Ease	of	economic	activity	–	average	ranking
Source:  Fraser Institute (2006), Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal (2007), International 
Institute for Management Development (2006), Transparency International (2006), World Bank (2007)11
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•  Is  lack  of  competition  really  a  problem?  Are  restrictive  business  practices  really 
widespread and do they give rise to serious economic inefficiencies and stymie growth 
and development?
•  Would competition policy undermine industrial policy aimed at promoting the growth 
of particular local industries?
•  How would competition policy impact on state-owned monopoly enterprises and 
enterprises that have monopolies granted by the government? These enterprises may 
have social goals in terms of using their monopoly position to set prices that favour 
some groups in society. 
•  Would competition policy merely favour large foreign enterprises at the expense of 
small domestically owned enterprises?
•  Is  the  market  large  enough  to  sustain  the  number  of  enterprises  necessary  for 
competition?
•  Is there enough expertise amongst economists, government officials and the judiciary 
to develop and sustain a successful competition policy at reasonable cost?
  To explore these policy questions, by drawing on evidence relevant to the transition 
economies in ASEAN which do not currently have competition policy, we have divided 
the part 1 research on introducing competition policy into a further two components:
•  review of international experience — from the introduction of competition policies 
in other transition economies, such as in Eastern Europe, Central and South America 
and Asia, and
•  assessment of case studies in ASEAN — the subject of this report.
3.2	 ASEAN	case	studies
In this report, we investigate three sectors where the degree of competition is of particular 
interest internationally and in Asia. We compare these sectors in a number ASEAN countries 
that have different competition policies. The main research question for these case studies 
is whether we can discern significant differences in market conditions and outcomes in 
countries that have different competition policies, including evidence of restrictive business 
practices in ASEAN countries that do not have competition laws and improved market 
outcomes in ASEAN countries that have recently introduced competition laws.
  The particular hypothesis we seek to test is that countries with fewer barriers to 
market entry have more competitive markets and more efficient market outcomes, such 
as more suppliers, lower market concentration, more frequent supplier entry and exit and 
consumer switching, higher productivity, lower margins and lower prices.12
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4.	 Analytical	framework
In assessing the case studies, we adopt the structure-conduct-performance framework. This 
methodology is widely used internationally by competition authorities and policy advisors, 
including the New Zealand Commerce Commission, to assess market competitiveness. 
This framework, and the dimensions of market structure, conduct and performance by 
which market competitiveness might be assessed, are shown in Figure 2 below. 
  This framework is founded on the principle that market performance follows from 
the structure of the market and the conduct of its participants. Competitive structural 
conditions encourage competitive conduct, through efficient incentives and signals, which 
promotes competitive and efficient performance outcomes.
4.1	 Structure
In terms of structural conditions, a market is likely to be more competitive where:
•  sellers exist in large numbers and market concentration is low — a large number of 
sellers and low concentration make it less likely that any one seller can unilaterally 
influence prices, make it less likely for sellers to reach understandings, whether overtly 
or tacitly, that reduce competition, and, even if such understandings can be reached, 







































































•  consumers perceive products and services to be relatively homogeneous — in  markets in 
which products are largely undifferentiated, competition, especially price competition, is 
likely to be stronger and buyers are less likely to develop brand preferences and loyalties 
that cause stickiness in buyers switching in the event of unilateral price movements by 
any one supplier
•  relevant market information about the offerings of alternative suppliers is widely 
available at little cost — making switching by buyers more likely
•  excess capacity exists — where a sector faces fixed costs and has excess capacity in the 
market for its output, it has greater incentive to cut price and to increase demand, 
volume and market share and
•  barriers to entry are low — the absence of high barriers to entering a market increases 
the potential for new competition to enter the market in the event that any one seller 
accumulates market power, which it attempts to exercise by raising prices above the 
competitive level.
4.1.1 Barriers to entry
The latter, barriers to entry, are a particular focus of competition policy and in the case 
studies assessed in this report. Contestability, existing and potential, is often an important 
force in providing competitive discipline to market participants. Barriers to entry can be 
either structural or behavioural. The sources of structural barriers to entry include:
•  the presence of significant economies of scale
•  limited access to essential resources, facilities, services or networks
•  patents or other intellectual property rights 
•  the presence of significant sunk costs in items such as capital, brand strength and 
reputation and
•  high cost and/or difficulty of obtaining and complying with regulatory approvals to 
participate in the market.
  Behavioural barriers to entry include entry-deterring strategies such as predatory 
pricing.
4.2	 Conduct
In terms of conduct, for a market to be competitive it must be free of behaviour that 
would reduce the level of competition between participants and deter efficient entry. 
Examples include contracts, arrangements or understandings that have the purpose or 
effect of substantially lessening competition in a market, fixing prices, excluding market 
participation, maintaining resale prices or using a dominant position in a market for anti-
competitive purposes. The likelihood of such conduct is influenced by the structure of 
the market, particularly whether there are ready opportunities for:14
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•  collusion by participants, even tacitly 
•  detection of deviant behaviour breaching a collusive understanding and 
•  retaliation to discipline deviants.
5.	 Selection	of	case	studies
International and Asian experience suggests a number of sectors in which analysis of the 
effects of the presence or absence of competition laws may be informative — banking 
and financial services, taxi services, cigarettes, beer and soft drinks, petroleum products 
distribution, poultry production, fertiliser sales, and building supplies particularly ce-
ment, aluminium, steel and glass. ERIA expressed particular interest in us examining the 
three sectors of cement, telecommunications, and transport and logistics, which span the 
range of production, service and infrastructure sectors. For each of these three sectors, 
we identified a number of countries of interest, spanning a range in the extent to which 
competition laws have been introduced.  
Table 3 shows the sectors and countries selected for case study.
Table	3:	Selection	of	case	studies
    Sectors
  Cement  Telecommunications   Transport and logistics 
 
Competition laws in force 
Indonesia	 √	 	 √	
Singapore	 	 	 √ 
Thailand 	 √	 √	 √	
Vietnam 	 	 √	 √	
	
Competition laws in development 
Malaysia 	 	 	 √	
Philippines	 √		 	 √	
	
No comprehensive competition laws 
Brunei Darussalam  	 	 √	
Cambodia   	 √	 √	




The cement industry is one of a few sectors that has a natural tendency towards geo-
graphically-concentrated monopoly or oligopoly, in the absence of regulation. In most 
countries around the world, the sector is dominated by a small number of large firms, 
often multinationals. 15
No. 374, 2008
  Marked economies of scale and high minimum efficient scale in production favour 
supplying dispersed markets from a small number of large plants. Plants run most efficiently 
at high capacity utilisation rates and marginal costs rise quickly as production falls below 
optimal levels. 
  The low value-to-weight ratio and high transportation costs provide a countervailing 
force in favour of a larger number of smaller, higher cost plants located close to markets. 
For example, in the United States little cement is shipped more than 200 to 300 miles 
(Mabry, 1998). The positive correlation between market concentration and price found 
in a number of studies (Allen, 1993; Jans and Rosenbaum, 1997; Koller and Weiss, 1989; 
McBride, 1983) becomes insignificant with inclusion of a measure of transportation cost 
(Newmark, 1998). 
  Cement production is also characterised by high fixed relative to variable costs. 
Industry entry and exit costs are high, given the level of capital investment required in 
plants. Of variable costs, the largest component, around 35 per cent, is energy input, 
with cement being one of the most energy intensive of industries. Competitive pressure 
from imports is also limited by high costs of entry — cement imported in bulk requires 
a bulk handling facility and shipping in bags incurs extra handling costs.
  The cement industry is closely connected with the volatile construction sector and 
often has difficulty balancing demand and supply and avoiding under and over-capacity. 
Furthermore, the price elasticity of demand is low, due to the lack of substitutes, such 
that reducing prices would redistribute demand between producers rather than increase 
aggregate demand.
  Under this combination of high fixed costs and volatile but price inelastic demand, 
it is not surprising that producers seek to avoid competing on price when demand enters 
a decline. In high fixed cost industries, competing on price to the point where, for the 
short run, only variable costs are covered entails a large reduction in prices, which presents 
a risk to the substantial capital base required.
  Experience in developed countries around the world suggests that complete deregu-
lation of the cement industry is unlikely to result in more competitive behaviour amongst 
producers due to the incentive for price collusion. Nor would regulatory intervention 
to increase competition necessarily result in better outcomes for consumers due to the 
large economies of scale and high capital intensity of the industry. The optimal approach 
appears to be to accept market concentration in a small number of large producers and 
to focus on constraining any abuse of their market power.
  The largest producers of cement worldwide are North Asia, Western Europe, the 
Indian sub-continent and North America. In 2004, South East Asian countries (Brunei, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 16
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Vietnam) ranked fifth with six per cent of world cement production. It also accounted 
for five per cent of world cement consumption, 16 per cent of world cement exports and 
















Source:  Adapted from Tradeship Publications (2005)
6.1	 Indonesia
Cement is considered a strategic commodity in Indonesia due to its importance to the 
construction sector and its upstream and downstream linkages to many other industries 
(Irianto, 2004). 
  The industry has gradually become increasingly liberalised. Under regulations 
introduced in the mid-1970s, the government controlled every aspect of the cement in-
dustry, from production to distribution and pricing (LSPEU, 2001). Regulatory controls 
took the form of guiding prices and distribution quotas, by region and for exports. The 
reason for such heavy regulation was to ensure that all areas of Indonesia were supplied 
with cement at reasonable prices. The consequences, however, were frequent seasonal 
shortages, high prices, insufficient investment in new capacity, wasteful freight haulage 
and forgone export opportunities. This prompted calls for deregulation, but producers 
were also accused of cartel activity, hoarding and speculation (Plunkett and Pasinringi, 
2002). These days ‘Cement producers can sell and set prices freely across the country.’ 
(Asian Development Bank, 2007, p.2).17
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6.1.1 Market concentration
In 2005, there were nine cement producers operating 15 cement plants with total installed 
production capacity of 46.1 million tonnes, as shown in Table 4 (Asian Development 
Bank, 2007). 
	 The largest producer, comprising three companies in the Semen Gresik Group 
(which is 51 per cent state owned), served 45 per cent of the market. The combined 
market share of the three largest producers (CR3) was very high at 90 per cent. These 
producers are also geographically concentrated, with three-quarters of their production 
capacity located in Java, which accounts for around two-thirds of national demand. These 
top three producers previously competed aggressively for market share in this region, but 
their strategic objective seems to have shifted from maximising market share to maximis-
ing profit. The remaining four small companies each operate a single plant or a few small 
plants in Sumatra or other islands. Each producer has adopted a geographically focused 
sales and distribution network, due to the low value-to-weight ratio of cement, high 
transport costs and dispersed geography of Indonesia.
6.1.2 Excess capacity
Excess capacity has fallen significantly and is likely to be squeezed further over the next 
Table	4:	Indonesian	cement	industry	2005
Company  Plant location  Capacity  Domestic  Market  Major 
    (tonnes)  sales   share  shareholder 
      (tonnes) 
PT Semen Gresik  East Java   8,200,000  7,903,635  25.1%  Indonesian  
          Government 
PT Semen Padang  West Sumatra   5,440,000  3,876,732  12.3%  Semen    
          Gresik 
PT Semen Tonasa  South Sulawesi   3,480,000  2,496,165  7.9%  Semen    
          Gresik 
PT Indocement Tunggal   West Java & South 
Prakarsa  Kalimantan  15,650,000  9,335,415  29.6%  Heidelberg  
PT Holcim Indonesia  West Java &  
  Central Java  9,700,000  4,793,114  15.2%  Holcim 
PT Semen Andalas  
Indonesia11  Aceh     1,124,580  3.6%  Lafarge 
PT Semen Bosowa Maros  South Sulawesi   1,800,000  922,363  2.9%  Bosowa    
          Group 
PT Semen Baturaja  South Sumatra and  
  Lampung  1,250,000  895,235  2.8%  Indonesian  
        Government 
PT Semen Kupang  East Nusa Tenggara  570,000  68,942  0.2%  Indonesian  
          Government 
Total	 	 46,090,000	 31,486,181	 100.0% 
Source: Indonesian Cement Association, in Asian Development Bank (2007) 
Note: 1Under reconstruction, supplied by imports from Lafarge group18
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few years. In 2005, domestic sales were 31 million tonnes and exports were five million 
tonnes, from production capacity of 44 to 46 million tonnes, implying around 85 per 
cent capacity utilisation (Tradeship Publications, 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2007). 
This followed a large increase in capacity before the Asian financial crisis, which lead to 
excess supply and low capacity utilisation of around 50 per cent in the 1990s (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007).
  In the year to May 2007, domestic demand grew by eight per cent (Indonesia Mat-
ters, 2007) after 1.5 per cent in 2006 and four per cent in 2005 (Indonesia Investment 
Coordinating Board, 2007). Assuming a yearly growth in demand of seven per cent over 
the next five years, the limits of existing capacity would be met by 2010 (Asian Develop-
ment Bank, 2007), resulting in a shortfall in supply to meet domestic demand by 2011 
(Indonesia Matters, 2007). Producers are expected to respond to the rising demand by 
increasing their capacity through upgrading existing plants or building new plants Indeed, 
the Indonesian government is offering tax breaks for cement industry investors (Indonesia 
Matters, 2007). 
6.1.3 Barriers to entry
Indonesia does not levy a tariff on imported cement. Domestic producers would therefore 
face competition from increased imports if prices rose. Nor are there any restrictions on 
foreign investors entering the cement industry, which could provide competitive pressure 
through either introduction of new firms or through mergers and acquisitions under which 
foreign investors are not willing to collude with domestic producers.
  Foreign new entrants are not expected to pose a major threat to existing cement 
producers, however, due to the large capital investment required, the need for a well-
developed distribution network and the importance of brand recognition and loyalty in 
Indonesia’s domestic market (Asian Development Bank, 2007).
6.1.4 Output and prices
In 2005, Indonesia produced 36 million tonnes of cement, its consumption was 31 mil-
lion tonnes, exports were five million tonnes (14 per cent of sales) and imports were 0.02 
million tonnes (Tradeship Publications, 2007). 
  Domestic prices rose 35 per cent between 2004 and 2005 (Asian Development 
Bank, 2007), but remain lower than in the Philippines (an average of US$72 per tonne 




During the 1986 to 1996 boom, Thailand was the largest ASEAN producer of cement. 
Construction was the worst hit of Thailand’s sectors in the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
Its cement producers survived the 1997 collapse of the construction sector by tapping 
export markets and a few producers were taken over by foreign companies (United Na-
tions, 2007).
  There is relatively little data available in the public domain on the Thai cement 
industry with which to assess its structure, conduct and performance. 
6.2.1 Market concentration
In 2001, Thailand had seven cement producers, operating 13 plants (Wu, 2001). Around 
42 per cent of total production came from the largest producer and the second largest 
producer had a 24 per cent market share, as shown in Figure 5 (AFTAONLINE, 2001). 
CR3 was 83 per cent. In 2001, the second largest, and majority foreign owned, producer 
made a bid for the third largest, and locally owned, producer, which prompted concerns 



















Source:	Tradeship Publications (2005); Tradeship Publications (2007)20
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6.2.2 Excess capacity
In 2005, total production capacity was 56 million tonnes, domestic sales were 28 million 
tonnes and exports were 14 million tonnes, indicating production capacity utilisation of 
around 75 per cent. This compares with overcapacity of around 65 per cent during the 
Asian financial crisis (Tradeship Publications, 2007).
6.2.3 Barriers to entry
Thailand imposes a 30 per cent tax duty on non-ASEAN cement imports (Indonesia 
Investment Coordinating Board, 2007).
6.2.4 Output and prices
Annual cement production in Thailand rose from 25 million tonnes to 42 million tonnes 
over the period 2000 to 2005 (United States Geographical Survey Mineral Resources 
Program, 2005; Tradeship Publications, 2007). In 2006, total consumption was 27 
million tonnes (CeMAP 2007). Thailand also exports significant volumes of cement, 14 
million tonnes in 2005 (Tradeship Publications, 2007).
  The domestic price is currently US$42/tonne. Export prices have increased over 














Source:  AFTAONLINE (2001)21
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6.3  Philippines
The Philippines is the third largest cement market in South East Asia after Thailand and 
Indonesia. Domestic production has grown under heavy government protection.
  The 1970s saw government protection and promotion of the domestic cement 
industry through high import tariffs, import restrictions and incentives to domestic pro-
ducers. In 1973, the Philippine Cement Industry Authority was established to regulate 
entry into the industry, to allocate supply and to control prices and cement exports. 
Producers colluded through informal agreement to set production quotas and to divide 
up geographical markets between them.
  Despite a shift towards deregulation and liberalisation in the 1980s, today the mar-
ket leader, which is state-owned, still sets sales volumes and locations for each producer. 
There remain accusations of tacit collusion on prices.
6.3.1 Market concentration
In 2006, there were 13 producers, operating 17 plants, providing total capacity of nearly 
20 million tonnes. Nationally, the largest producers had a 37 per cent market share, as 
shown in Table 5. CR3 was 60 per cent (CeMAP, 2007). By region, however, markets are 
highly concentrated, with CR4 in each of the five geographic regions of the Philippines 


















Source:   Tradeship Publications (2005); Tradeship Publications (2007)22
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  The small number of producers in the industry and the very active industry as-
sociation would provide ease of opportunity for collusion or co-ordination between 
producers.
Table	5:	Philippines	cement	industry	2006
Company  Installed capacity (million tonnes)  Capacity share
Holcim  7.24    37.0% 
Apo Cement Corporation  2.40    12.3% 
Fortune Cement Corporation  2.10    10.7% 
Solid Cement Corporation  1.86    9.5% 
Republic Cement Corporation  1.10    5.6% 
FR Cement Corporation  1.10    5.6% 
Northern Cement Corporation  0.96    4.9% 
Taiheiyo Cement Philippines  0.84    4.3% 
Iligan Cement Corporation  0.50    2.6% 
Mindanao Cement Corporation  0.50    2.6% 
Rizal Cement   0.38  1.9%   
Goodfound Cement  0.35  1.8% 
Pacific Cement Philippines Inc.  0.25  1.3% 
Total  19.57  100.0%
Source: Cement Manufacturers of the Philippines CeMAP (2007)
6.3.2 Excess capacity
The cement industry has significant excess capacity. Capacity utilisation fell from 97 per 
cent in 1990 to 49 per cent in 1999 (Aldaba, 2000), before rising to 60 per cent in 2006 
(CeMAP, 2007).
6.3.3 Barriers to entry
Despite its excess capacity, the Philippines has been a target for foreign cement exports 
due to its relatively open market. In 2002, its tariffs stood at three per cent on cement 
imports from ASEAN countries and five per cent on cement imports from non-ASEAN 
countries, whilst other Asian countries had import tariffs of between five and 100 per 
cent (Escolar, 2004). Imports have fluctuated, but remain a small share of total consump-
tion. Imports peaked in 2001 at 2.2 million tonnes, mainly from Indonesia, Taiwan and 
Japan, before dropping to less than 10,000 tonnes in 2003 and rising again to 244,000 
tonnes, two per cent of total consumption, in 2006, mainly from Japan (CeMAP, 2007; 
Tradeship Publications, 2005; Tradeship Publications, 2007). The Philippines has been 
subject to cyclical dumping, under which a foreign producer sets its export price below 
its domestic market price, not for predatory reasons, but due to global excess capacity 
and depressed demand, such as during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
6.3.4 Output and prices
As shown in Figure 7, in recent years the Philippines has produced around 13 million 23
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tonnes of cement each year and consumed around 12 million tonnes (Tradeship Publi-
cations, 2005; Tradeship Publications, 2007). There have been reports of poor quality 
cement in the domestic market because the Department of Trade and Industry does not 

















Source:  Tradeship Publications (2005); Tradeship Publications (2007)
  Exports peaked in 2001 at 4.1 million tonnes, mostly to Taiwan and the USA, 
dropping to 2.5 million tonnes in 2006, mostly to Mauritius (Tradeship Publications, 
2005; Tradeship Publications, 2007; CeMAP, 2007). Poor quality can also be an obstacle 
to exports under non-tariff barriers pertaining to product standards and certification (e.g. 
certification for strength testing for the Japanese market). 
  Selling prices are surprisingly uniform between producers despite evidence of different 
cost structures (Mehta, 2007). Over the period January 1999 to May 2000, the sequence 
of observed price increases by producers, by almost the same amounts, was inconsistent 
with competitive behaviour and renewed concerns about collusion. There was very little 
variation between producers in ex-plant prices within each geographic market and not 
much variation in average prices across the country’s three major geographic markets. 
The only possible valid explanation for this similarity in prices is similar cost structures. 
Based on the limited data available, Aldaba (2000) finds that producers seem to have 
significantly different cost structures and therefore concludes that almost identical prices 
and price increases at a time of excess supply and depressed demand suggest the presence 
of collusion and price co-ordination.24
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  In the first quarter of 2006, prices were US$76/tonne for bulk cement and 
US$78/tonne for bagged cement (Tradeship Publications, 2007), the highest of the 













Source:  Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (2007); Tradeship Publications (2007) 
7.	 Telecommunications
A strong telecommunications sector is seen as fundamental to the development of the 
national economy. Indeed, the sector has been strategically supported by some Asian 
governments as a means to overcome their economic recession.
  Telecommunications, as a ‘network industry’, is traditionally seen as a natural 
monopoly. The expense of reproducing the network presents a major cost barrier to 
new services. Historically, network and service providers have therefore tended to be 
integrated.
  Around the world, countries are seeking to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of their telecommunications sectors by separating network and service components and 
promoting competition in the latter. Many have also introduced reforms to separate 
policy makers, regulators and operators, given the different skills required and incentives 
faced.
  Service providers need access to, but not necessarily ownership of, networks. 
Operating  telecommunications  networks  and  providing  telecommunications  services 25
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are very different businesses, involving very different types of investments and requiring 
different management skills. Network investments typically have a long life, low level 
of complexity, low sensitivity over confidentiality of technical information, low risk and 
relatively low return, making them suitable for risk-averse investors. In contrast, service 
investments have a relatively short product life, high level of complexity, sometimes highly 
confidential technical information and high risk, requiring compensation by high rates of 
return (David Butcher and Associates, 2006). 
  Separation lowers the cost of entry into the market for telecommunications serv-
ices, enhancing competition between providers and enabling development of specialised 
customer services. Separation also removes the ability to inhibit competition by using 
network profits to subsidise services in markets that might otherwise attract competitors. 
Separation may also result in better investment decisions. It makes interconnection costs 
more transparent. It provides network owners with incentives to maximise utilisation 
regardless of signal source and to expand coverage into new areas and sources of busi-
ness, but little incentive to over-invest, which is common where networks and services 
are bundled (David Butcher and Associates, 2006). Fink et al. (2001) even suggests 
that inefficiencies introduced by some duplication of networks may be small relative to 
operational inefficiencies resulting from a lack of competitive pressure. Separation also 
simplifies competition regulation, in needing to apply to network operations only.
  On the downside, the ‘digital divide’ can widen with liberalisation, as the private 
sector is less willing to provide services to unprofitable rural and remote areas. The social 
objective of ‘universal access’, including in areas of low population and/or income, was 
in some countries the original reason for combined network and service provision, by 
government. In moving to competitive telecommunications sectors, countries have ad-
dressed social objectives by adopting regulatory principles to prevent or limit abuse of 
market power and to require compliance with minimum standards for reliability, quality 
and social outcomes.
  Despite a move away from traditional public monopolies, most Asian governments 
are still reluctant to allow unrestricted entry, to eliminate limits on private and foreign 
ownership and to establish strong independent regulators.
  Entry restrictions are becoming increasingly difficult to justify, however, in the 
face of technological development and mounting evidence of the positive effects of com-
petition. Technological advances have significantly lowered network costs and vertical 
separation has increased competitive entry (Smith, 2005). Analysis by Fink et al. (2001) 
across 12 developing Asian economies finds that the implementation of comprehensive 
reform has led to significantly higher levels of main line availability, service quality and 
labour productivity. That said, it is not liberalisation or competition alone that reduces the 26
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unit costs of telecommunications services, but reform in combination with technological 
development, increasing usage and maturing competitive markets (Kim, 2003).
  In most countries, liberalisation to increase competition was introduced earlier and 
to a greater degree in mobile telecommunications services than in the fixed line sector, 
due to less need to protect state-owned incumbent operators. The resulting increase in 
competition and reduction in prices has led to mobile subscribers outnumbering fixed line 
subscribers in many countries. In richer countries, mobile services are likely to be comple-
mentary as most businesses and households already have access to the fixed network. In 
low income countries, mobile services can be a substitute for fixed line services, especially 
where there are long waiting lists for fixed line connections (Fink et al. 2001). 
  The availability of pre-payment plans has also contributed to the popularity of mobile 
services in Asia. In poorer countries, such as Cambodia, most people could not afford or 
would not qualify for a subscription telephone service. The availability of prepaid cards 
of low denominations and cheap second-hand handsets make mobile telecommunications 
more accessible. For service providers, prepayment also reduces the risk of subscriber 
default.
7.1	 Thailand
From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the demand for telecommunications services 
grew at an annual rate of over 20 per cent as the Thai economy experienced rapid growth 
(Mongkolporn and Yin, 2006). This contributed to a shortage of telecommunications 
services and long waiting lists for installation of telephone lines. The weakness of Thai-
land’s telecommunications infrastructure, particularly its inability to meet the needs of 
business users, was a clear impediment to economic development.
  Telecommunications services were supplied by two state-owned enterprises, one 
for domestic and long distance calls, the other for international calls. To address the sup-
ply shortage, the Thai government did not pursue privatisation or liberalisation, but, in 
1986, introduced the build-transfer-operate strategy. This allows private firms to construct 
fixed line networks, ownership of which they are required to transfer to the government 
or regulatory authority, but which they are entitled to operate for a set period under 
conditions specified in a concession agreement, which enables the firm to recoup its initial 
investment costs plus a profit. Alternatively, private firms may resell services they have 
bulk purchased from the state-owned enterprises.
  By 1999, 30 concessions had been granted (Thailand Development Research In-
stitute, 1999). These concessions have not produced a fully competitive market, as the 
state-owned enterprises still control prices, which prevents price competition. The Thai 
government controls the price of services and telephone density. No firm is free to choose 27
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its output and price levels. To maximise profits, it therefore has to focus on minimising 
the cost of production at a given service level and price. Indeed, analysis by Mongkol-
porn and Yin (2006) finds that the 1993 concessions generated upward shifts in both 
the short-run and long-run cost curves of the main state-owned enterprise, attributed to 
a reduction in scale economies in the post-concession period. Although all call charges 
from fixed lines are regulated, competition has resulted in some firms offering significant 
reductions in installation charges, a single rate for long distance calls and free internet as 
incentives to increase fixed line subscriptions, 
  Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector is required by the new Thai con-
stitution and for World Trade Organisation accession. In response to the Asian financial 
crisis, reform was propelled by the need to find more capital and to reduce the cost of 
doing business in Thailand. This included, as a high priority, increasing competition and 
providing more services and new technology in telecommunications.
  From the late 1990s, the Thai government has been pursuing sector reform, lib-
eralisation and competition. It adopted plans to corporatise and subsequently privatise 
the state-owned providers, to convert the private concessions granted previously and to 
establish an independent regulatory authority. Full liberalisation was scheduled for 2006 
(Soonthonsiripong, 2004). The process of converting concessions has proved difficult 
(e.g. converting concessions into their equity value and resolving disputes), as has estab-
lishing an independent regulator (David Butcher and Associates, 2006). In 2006, the 
Thai government began processing a Telecommunications Law to implement the new 
regulatory regime. 
  Although Thailand has realised considerable benefits from the liberalisation to date 
of its telecommunications sector, there is still much further regulatory reform required. 
Whilst low charges and a competitive market have driven growth in the mobile sector, 
growth in the fixed line sector remains hampered by poor infrastructure. The build-
transfer-operate concessions to expand fixed line infrastructure have had mixed success. 
Following the September 2006 coup, the prime minister announced plans to merge the 
two main network companies to operate a ‘pool’ in which providers could rent the ability 
to operate rather than have to apply for concessions, as a means to increase competition 
and consequently growth (Wikipedia, 2007). After entry of new companies, the mobile 
market is now in need of consolidation and regulatory changes will significantly influence 
its future shape (Paul Budde Communication, 2007a; 2007b).
7.1.1 Market concentration
In early 2007, there were three operators in the fixed line sector and five in the mobile 
sector (Ernst and Young, 2007). Under the first step of the liberalisation programme 28
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(1998 to 2000, existing state entities license private sector competitors), the main state-
owned enterprise issued 16 concession contracts, which have since taken 50 per cent of 
its market share (David Butcher and Associates, 2006). Rapid growth in the number of 
mobile subscribers followed entry into the market in 2001 of two additional companies 
and the launch of a cellular joint venture, which challenged the dominance of the existing 
duopoly and increased competition (Paul Budde Communication, 2007a). Nevertheless, 
the two largest private mobile phone operators have a combined market share of more 
than 90 per cent (David Butcher and Associates, 2006).
7.1.2 Barriers to entry
The Thai government does not allow foreign investors to establish their own networks, 
but does allow foreign direct investment, within limits that have fluctuated but ranged 
between a 20 per cent (Fink et al., 2001) and 40 per cent shareholding (Soonthonsiripong, 
2004).
7.1.3 Output and prices
The number of fixed lines per 100 inhabitants rose steadily from 2.4 in 1990 to 10.7 in 
2004. The mobile market has grown rapidly since 2000, as shown in Figure 9, to 43.0 
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  The number of mobile phone subscribers has leapt from around two million in 
the late 1990s (Thailand Investor Service Center, 2004) to over 38 million by early 2007 
(Paul Budde Communication, 2007a). Penetration is now 11 per cent for fixed lines 
and 64 per cent for mobile services (Ernst and Young, 2007). The number of mobile 
subscribers first exceeded fixed line subscribers in 2001 (Ernst and Young, 2007) and 
mobile phone services in Thailand now outnumber fixed line services by around five to 
one (Paul Budde Communication, 2007c), with over half the Thai population owning a 
mobile phone (Wikipedia, 2007).
  Over the same period, service quality improved markedly, as shown in Figure 10. 
The waiting list for fixed line connection fell by two-thirds and the number of faults per 
100 fixed lines fell by 95 per cent. 
  Mobile phones were introduced into Thailand in 1989. Growth in this market 
was slow initially, due to the high cost of handsets and calls, but vigorous competition 
under free market entry for the sale of handsets, has reduced the price of handsets and 
increased the number of subscribers (Soonthonsiripong, 2004). Under price control by 
the state-owned enterprises, however, there has been little movement in connection, 
subscription and call charges, as shown in Figure 11.  These prices are shown in US dol-
lars for cross-country comparisons, in Table 6.
Figure	10:	Thai	telephone	services	—	quality
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Table	6:	Thai	telephone	services	—	prices	(US	dollars)
    2003  2004  2005
Connection  Fixed line  80.76  83.29  81.09 
   Mobile  9.64  22.08  21.50 
Monthly subscription  Fixed line  2.41  2.49  2.42 
   Mobile       
Three minute call  Fixed line, peak  0.07  0.07  0.07 
   Mobile, peak  0.36  0.37  0.36
Source:  International Telecommunication Union (2006) 
Note:  Mobile monthly subscription — prepaid since 2003
7.2	 Vietnam
Telecommunications is one of several sectors in Vietnam reserved for largely state own-
ership on ‘strategic’ and ‘security’ grounds, which has prompted a gradual and cautious 
approach to liberalisation.
  In recognition of telecommunications as a key component of the infrastructure 
required  for  national  economic  development,  the  government  has  made  substantial 
investment in the sector and gradually eased control, to expand and upgrade capacity. 
In 1990, the sector operated under strict state control, with effectively only one service 
provider, which was state-owned. Since 1988, foreign companies have been allowed to 
establish operations to produce telecommunications equipment and material or to assist 
domestic local operators in the provision of services. Since 1995, new domestic companies 
have been allowed to provide telecommunications services in competition with the state-
owned monopoly and new services have been introduced. Since 1997, service providers 
have been allowed greater flexibility in setting prices and authorities have sought to make 
regulations more transparent and streamlined. Since 1998, a number of state-owned 
telecommunications companies have sought to increase the role of the private sector in 
providing capital for further investment in the industry (Nguyen et al., 2004). In areas 
where there is strong competition, operators are authorised to set tariffs and service 
charges, whilst the state-owned provider retains control over tariffs and service charges 
in monopoly areas, but aims to reduce service charges until they reach the regional level 
(APEC, 2006).
  These changes have brought about rapid growth in fixed lines and mobile phones, 
as well as a marked widening in the geographical and socioeconomic coverage of the 
expanding and multiplying networks. The average waiting time for fixed line connection 
has fallen, but is still relatively long. Quality of access in rural areas remains poor. Prices 
have fallen substantially, but remain higher than elsewhere in South East Asia. The main 
reason for prices not falling faster is continuing excess demand for services, with the short-32
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fall in supply attributed to insufficient capital investment, especially in infrastructure. The 
introduction of competition has encouraged some innovative marketing and promotional 
campaigns, such as low price calls at set times of day, which have put additional pressure 
on the infrastructure and resulted in congestion (Business Monitor International, 2007). 
To date, what capital has been forthcoming has come mostly from the state budget, but 
longer term the capital needed to upgrade and expand services will need to be found 
from the private sector, domestic and foreign. Contributing to the shortage of capital 
for expansion have been unclear rules for tariff setting. Foreign investors are deterred 
by pricing policies that reflect non-cost-based objectives, monopoly behaviour and low 
productivity from poorly developed accounting standards and manufacturing commit-
ments, as well as efforts to preserve a substantial state role in the sector (David Butcher 
and Associates, 2006; Paul Budde Communication, 2007d). 
  Vietnam’s Post and Telecommunications Development Strategy to 2010 aims to 
make this a leading sector, contributing an increasing share of the country’s GDP. The 
Universal Service Program to 2010 aims to accelerate telephone and internet penetration 
to every citizen, focusing on the rural and mountainous areas and areas that have difficult 
socioeconomic conditions (APEC, 2006). 
7.2.1 Market concentration
There are five operators in each of the fixed line and mobile sectors (Ernst and Young, 
2007). The dominant operator is still the giant state-owned conglomerate of companies, 
which holds 94 per cent of the fixed line sector and a 72 per cent market share in the mo-
bile phone sector (US Commercial Service, 2007). The mobile sector is dominated by the 
top three operators, with 30 per cent, 25 per cent and 15 per cent of mobile subscribers, 
totalling 70 per cent of the market between them (US Commercial Service, 2007).
7.2.2 Barriers to entry
Previously, the sector was partially opened to foreign companies, but primarily as sup-
pliers of equipment and finance for constructing network infrastructure for operation by 
Vietnamese companies. With accession to the World Trade Organization, limitations on 
foreign companies providing telecommunications services will be relaxed, bringing in 
further competition (US Commercial Service, 2007).
7.2.3 Output and prices
The Vietnamese telecommunications sector has been growing at a rate of around 25 per 
cent per year, double the average for the Asia region and triple the world average (US 
Commercial Service, 2007). Both fixed line and mobile services have grown strongly over 33
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the past 15 years, as shown in Figure 12, to 18.8 fixed lines and 11.4 mobile subscribers 
per 100 inhabitants in 2005. 
  In 1990, Vietnam had only 100,000 telephone subscribers, equating to 0.14 fixed 
lines per 100 people, one of the lowest rates in the world. By 2000, it was approaching 
three million fixed lines, four per 100 people (Nguyen et al., 2004). Most recent data 













1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Fixed lines per 100 inhabitants
Mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants
	
Source:  International Telecommunication Union (2006)
with the number of mobile subscribers exceeding fixed line subscribers from 2005 (Ernst 
and Young, 2007). In 2006, 61 per cent of total subscribers were for mobile services (US 
Commercial Service, 2007).
  The  limited  data  available  suggest  that  service  quality  has  improved  over 
recent  years,  especially  for  mobile  services  over  the  past  two  years  (US  Com-
mercial  Service,  2007).  In  a  survey  of  business  users,  however,  most  respondents 
reported  reliability  problems,  especially  wiring  and  cable  problems  which  were 
reported  by  91  per  cent  of  respondents  (David  Butcher  and  Associates,  2006). 
Since 1990, prices have fallen for connection, subscription and calls as shown in Figure 
13, more markedly for mobile services. These prices are shown in US dollars for cross-
country comparisons in Table 7.
  Since 1990, nominal prices on international calls have been reduced seven times 
by 10 to 15 per cent each time (Nguyen et al., 2004).34
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  Telecommunications services remain relatively costly, however. In a survey of busi-
ness users, for 41 per cent of businesses, telecommunications costs were their first, second 
or third largest business cost, at two to six per cent of total business costs (David Butcher 
and Associates, 2006). The price elasticity of demand is low as most businesses cannot 
do without telecommunications. In the survey, 79 per cent reported that they would not 
reduce usage significantly if costs rose (David Butcher and Associates, 2006).
7.3	 Cambodia
Cambodia has a largely state-owned fixed line infrastructure, most of which has been 
installed since 1990, and a privately owned mobile sector. Mobile phone companies have 
Table	7:	Vietnamese	telephone	services	—	prices	(US	dollars)
      2003  2004  2005
Connection  Fixed line  51.58  50.99  38.00 
     Mobile  35.17     
Monthly  
subscription  Fixed line  1.74  1.72  1.71 
     Mobile  7.03     
Three minute 
call  Fixed line, peak  0.02  0.02  0.02 
     Mobile, peak  0.32  0.15  0.15
Source:  International Telecommunication Union (2006) 
Note:  Mobile monthly subscription — prepaid since 2003
their own networks, but do share some facilities and lease some space on the state-con-
trolled fibre optic network. The fixed line sector has limited penetration, high unit costs, 
too few connections to cover fixed network costs and poor reliability. In contrast, Cam-
bodia’s mobile sector is close to world class in quality, although access is limited in rural 
areas. The reasons for the contrast are that the fixed line sector, under state ownership, 
has suffered low investment and no autonomy, resulting in poor service and slow growth. 
The mobile sector, under private sector funding and light-handed regulation, with the 
government liberalising the market at an early stage and allowing private investment and 
competition, has achieved good service, fast growth and increasing competition (David 
Butcher and Associates, 2006). 
  As a consequence, although Cambodia has an average rate of telephone penetra-
tion for countries of its income level, its mobile sector market share is the highest in the 
world (David Butcher and Associates, 2006). The focus for increasing competition is 
therefore strengthening the previously incumbent fixed line sector to compete with the 
mobile services of strong new entrants — the opposite strategy to other countries.
  Cambodia has an integrated policy, regulatory, operational and asset manage-
ment agency for telecommunications, which has led to conflicts of interest, poor asset 36
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management and political intervention in business decisions. It still has a confusing mix 
of government shareholdings and agreements and an ‘interconnection maze’ (World In-
vestment News, 2005). A Telecommunications Law is in the process of being drafted.
  Confounding the development of competition in the domestic market has been 
the presence of outlaw telephone companies, which set up antennae near the Thai border 
and pay Thai companies to illegally tap into the cheaper Thai networks. In 2005, 500 
illegal antennae and relay stations operating across Cambodia’s western provinces were 
reported to be costing the Cambodian government up to US$60,000 a month in lost 
revenue (iTnews, 2005).
7.3.1 Market concentration
There are currently three operators in the fixed line sector and four operators in the mobile 
sector (Ernst and Young, 2007). There is reported to be a risk of a dominant provider 
emerging in the latter (David Butcher and Associates, 2006).
7.3.2 Barriers to entry
Cambodia does not limit foreign direct investment in the telecommunications sector 
(Fink et al., 2001).
7.3.3 Output and prices
The number of fixed lines per 100 inhabitants rose steadily from 0.04 in 1990 to 0.3 in 
2003. Mobile services were first introduced into Cambodia at the end of 1992 (World 
Investment News, 2005) and within a year the number of mobile subscribers exceeded 
fixed line subscribers, the earliest of Asian countries (Ernst and Young, 2007). The mobile 
market has continued to grow rapidly to 7.5 subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 2005, as 
shown in Figure 14. Although low compared with Thailand and Vietnam, this is high 
for a less developed country.
  By 2000, more than four out of five subscribers were using wireless phones, the 
highest ratio in the world, most of which are mobile, but five per cent of all telephone 
subscribers use wireless fixed lines (World Investment News, 2005). Latest data report 
40,000 fixed lines and 1.1 million mobile subscribers (Totel Pty Ltd, 2007), representing 
0.3 fixed lines and 11 mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants (Ernst and Young, 2007).
  As for Vietnam, there are few official data on trends in service quality. Available 
data suggest a marked improvement over the 1990s, as shown Figure 15, with a 94 per 
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  Since 1990, prices have fallen for connection, subscription and calls as shown in 
Figure 16. Over 90 per cent of mobile subscribers have opted for prepaid. Also con-
tributing to the growth of the mobile sector is billing in US dollars, which reduces the 
exchange rate risk to service providers and investors. These prices are shown in US dollars 
for cross-country comparisons, in Table 8.
  Charges are generally lower in Cambodia than in Thailand and Vietnam, as shown 
in Figure 16 to Figure 18.
Table	8:	Cambodian	telephone	services	—	prices	(US dollars)
    2003  2004  2005
Connection  Fixed line, business  51.59      
   Fixed line, residential  29.45       
   Mobile  0.59       
Monthly subscription  Fixed line, business  5.89      
   Fixed line, residential  2.94          
  Mobile          
Three minute call  Fixed line, peak  0.03     0.03 
   Mobile, peak  0.24  0.18   
Source:  International Telecommunication Union (2006) 
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The third case study sector is transport and logistics. This is very broad area, of variable 
data availability and quality. For illustrative purposes, the case studies focus on:
•  a broad indicator — trade freedom, in terms of the ease with which goods and services 
can move across borders and
•  one specific sector — sea freight, with regard to competition in port services. 
8.1	 Trade	freedom
In as broad an indicator as trade freedom, it is difficult to distinguish between the different 
causes of costs and delays in cross-border movements — whether insufficient competition 
in markets for transport services (e.g. monopoly suppliers, high market concentration, col-
lusion by incumbents), which is the main interest of this study, or official barriers to entry 
(e.g. tariff and non-tariff barriers, border entry requirements, national flag carriers), poor 
transport infrastructure (e.g. insufficient port capacity, poor quality roads), administrative 
difficulties (e.g. complex or inefficient border procedures, unofficial charges) or cultural 
and social impediments (e.g. language, road signs and traffic rules). Additionally, in this 
study, we are interested in not only barriers to entry from outside each country, but also 
barriers to domestic new entrants. Measures of the ease of cross-border trading may be 
more a reflection of trade policy than of domestic competition policy and conditions. 42
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Nevertheless, it may be informative to examine how trade freedom varies across countries 
that have different states of competition law.  
  The Trade Freedom component of the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage 
Foundation and Wall Street Journal, 2007) is shown in Figure 20. This is a composite 
measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of 
goods and services. A country with zero tariffs and zero non-tariff barriers would score 
100, as Singapore did in 2003 to 2005. In contrast, Laos scored as low as 10 out of 100 























Source:  Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal (2007) 
Note: Score out of 100, higher score reflects greater freedom
  Freedom to Trade Internationally is also measured as one component of the 
Economic Freedom of the World index (Fraser Institute, 2006). As shown in Figure 
21, Singapore again rates highly. Freedom to Trade Internationally is indicated to have 
improved markedly in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand over the past 35 years. As 
above, these countries now rate about the same as Malaysia.
  The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings also include the component   
Ease of Trading Across Borders (World Bank, 2007). This reflects the number of docu-
ments, time and cost to import and export, with a higher ranking indicating greater ease. 
Singapore is ranked highest of 178 countries in both the Ease of Trading Across Borders 
component, as shown in Figure 22, and the composite Ease of Doing Business index. 43
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According to this measure, Malaysia is still performing significantly better than Indonesia, 
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Figure	23:	Subcomponents	of	Freedom	to	Trade	Internationally	in	six	ASEAN	states
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Note: Score out of 10, higher score reflects greater freedom
  It is possible to examine the specific measures used in compiling the trade com-
ponents of both the Economic Freedom of the World and Ease of Doing Business.
In terms of the subcomponents of the Economic Freedom of the World’s Freedom to 
Trade Internationally component, Singapore scores best on tariffs, regulatory trade bar-45
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riers (comprising non-tariff trade barriers and compliance cost of importing and export-
ing) and international capital market controls, whilst Vietnam scores worst, as shown in 
Figure 22. 
	 Of these subcomponents, there has been a general reduction in tariffs over the 
past few decades, particularly in the Philippines and Thailand, as shown in Figure 24. 
There has been less progress in reducing international capital market controls, as shown 
in Figure 25, with the maintenance of restrictions on foreign investment and ownership. 
Regulatory trade barriers, as shown in Figure 26, have not been measured for as long 




















Source:  Fraser Institute (2006) 
Note: Score out of 10, higher score reflects greater freedom46




















Source:   Fraser Institute (2006) 
Note: Score out of 10, higher score reflects greater freedom
   
The Ease of Doing Business’ Trading Across Borders shows significant correlation 
between the number of documents required for, the time taken by and the cost of 
import/export procedures (correlation coefficients ranging from 0.50 to 0.80), as 
shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28. 
Figure	27:	Time	and	documents	required	to	import	and	export	in	nine	ASEAN	states:	
2007
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Source:   World Bank (2007)
	 In all nine countries, importing requires at least as many documents as exporting. 
Import procedures take longer than export procedures in three countries and cost more 
in five countries. Most noticeable is the greater time and cost to import into and export 
from Laos. Import procedures take 50 days into Laos, compared with three days into 
Singapore, and cost over five times as much.
  Of the import and export times and costs shown above, preparing the required 
documents is the most time-consuming step in all but Singapore. Document preparation 
times average 15 days and range from one day in Singapore to over 30 days in Cambodia 
and Laos. Port and terminal handling is generally the most expensive step, averaging 
US$212 per container and ranging from US$75 to export from Thailand to US$431 to 
import into Vietnam. In Indonesia and Thailand the most expensive step is documents 
preparation. In Cambodia it is customs clearance. In Malaysia and Laos it is inland trans-
portation and handling. Most costly overall is inland transportation and handling in Laos, 
at US$1,600 per container for both import and export, which compares with US$100 
in Singapore.48
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8.2	 Sea	freight
Container ports in South East Asia accounted for an estimated 30 per cent of the world’s 
transhipment traffic in 2004, forecast to increase to 32.5 per cent by 2015 (Lam and 
Yap, 2007). The three main ports are Singapore, Port Klang (Malaysia) and Tanjung 
Pelepas (Malaysia).
8.2.1 Singapore
Singapore’s historical importance derives from its strategic position relative to the Straits 
of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest sea lanes and the main route for goods shipped 
between Asia and Europe. Singapore’s container port is run by the government-owned 
PSA corporation. It handles around one-fifth of the world’s total container transhipments. 
In 2006, Singapore handled 24 million 20 foot equivalent units (TEUs) of containers 
(PSA, 2007). It is an efficiently operated port, but PSA is the only operator available 
(Asian Economic News, 2000).
  Singapore has recently faced strong competition as an international transportation 
hub from neighbouring Malaysia. Between 1999 and 2004, competition from Port Klang 
and Tanjung Pelepas detracted from Singapore’s transhipment performance. Singapore 
maintained its dominant position in the region in terms of market share by transhipment 
throughput and annualised slot capacity, but seemed to be gradually losing ground to 
the Malaysian ports (Lam and Yap, 2007).
8.2.2 Malaysia
Malaysia has 100 ports and cargo handling facilities throughout the country. Recent 
developments include privatisation of ports, development of the Port of Tanjung Pe-
lepas, development of Port Klang as the national loading centre, expansion of capacities 
at various ports, and entry of foreign partners at Tanjung Pelepas and Westport (Yean 
et al., 2007). 
  In benchmarking the performance of Australian against selected other ports world-
wide, Productivity Commission (2003) found container charges per TEU to be signifi-
cantly lower at Singapore and Malaysia’s Port Klang than Australian ports. Of the ports 
studied, Port Klang had the highest yard utilisation rate (over 32,000 TEUs per hectare) 
and second highest berth utilisation rate (over 1,200 TEUs per berth metre per year).
  In competing with Singapore, Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas have the advantages 
of lower costs and more room for expansion and their efficiency is improving, whilst 
shipping companies complain of rising costs and operational inflexibilities in Singapore. 
Tanjung Pelepas opened in 2000 and immediately secured two of Singapore’s biggest 51
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shipping clients (Nightly Business Report, 2006). It was reported to be around 30 per cent 
cheaper than Singapore at this time (Asian Economic News, 2000). Capacity utilisation at 
this port reached 93 per cent in 2005, but further expansion is planned to accommodate 
increasing container traffic (Lam and Yap, 2007). 
8.2.3 Indonesia
Around 90 per cent of Indonesia’s international trade occurs via sea ports (Patunru et 
al., 2007). There is little competition in port services, under the state-owned monopoly 
supplier. Under central co-ordination, ports are cross-subsidised. The centralisation of 
investment and development decisions is reported to be a major impediment to efficiency. 
Both shipping lines and shippers have called for improved efficiency, which would be 
enhanced by greater competition. 
  Indonesia’s port logistics costs are relatively high at 14 per cent of sales price, 
compared with 8.5 per cent for an ‘efficient’ port and 7.9 per cent for a ‘best practice’ 
port such as Japan (Patunru et al., 2007). Terminal handling charges are high for the 
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  The main sources of inefficiency in output logistics costs are poor infrastructure 
(31 per cent), government policies such as export procedures (30 per cent) and unofficial 
payments on roads and at ports (22 per cent). Port users report the two greatest obstacles 
in vessel clearance to be additional payments whilst in port and the number of institutions 52
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involved between vessel arrival and departure, followed by the volume of ship traffic in 
the port, port infrastructure and container unloading process. In cargo clearance, the two 
greatest obstacles reported are additional payments whilst in port and port congestion, 
followed by container loading to trucks, the number of institutions involved, additional 
payments outside the port, the quality of roads outside the port and inspection at the exit 
gate. Poor port infrastructure raises the likelihood of unofficial payments being requested 
to speed up clearance. Patunru et al. (2007) reports the reasons for unofficial payments 
to include packaging, Harmonised System code negotiation, late response to import 
notification, correction notes and avoidance of physical inspection.
9.	 Cross-country	comparisons
In cross-country, and indeed cross-sector, comparisons, rigorous analysis is hampered by 
the limited availability of accurate and comparable data. The evidence available is also 
somewhat circumstantial, in exploring how market structure, conduct and performance 
differ between countries at different stages in developing competition laws without prov-
ing a causal link. The observed differences in market conditions and outcomes might 
reflect influences other than competition laws, such as the quality of institutions con-
ducive to economic activity, the government’s economic development or trade policies, 
or characteristics or policies specific to the case study sectors. It is difficult to discern to 
what extent the presence or absence of competition laws may have contributed to the 
observed differences.
  A crude comparison does, however, suggest some correlations, if not necessarily 
causal relationships. In Table 9, we summarise the relative performance of each sector in 
each country investigated. These ratings do show some signs of better market conditions 
and outcomes in countries where competition laws are more advanced. 
  As shown in Table 2 earlier in this report, there is quite high correlation (0.68) 
between competition law status and ease of economic activity generally. In the sectors 
investigated in this study, the correlation between competition law status and market 
conditions and outcomes is most strongly positive for cement output and prices and 
trade freedom. There is, however, a negative correlation in some sectors, most noticeably 
for market concentration and barriers to entry in the telecommunications sector, excess 
capacity in the cement sector, and sea freight. 
In cement, excess capacity is greater and barriers to entry lower, and therefore rated as 
more conducive to competition, in the Philippines than in Indonesia and Thailand, both 
of which have more established competition laws. Market performance in terms of output 
and prices rates lower, however, reflecting suspected price collusion. Market concentra-53
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tion is high in all three countries, reflecting the characteristics of cement production. In 
telecommunications, Cambodia, even without competition laws, rates better in terms of 
market concentration, barriers to entry and prices than Thailand and Vietnam, which 
both have competition laws, reflecting early liberalisation and competition in its mobile 
sector. All three countries have seen marked increases in output, as well as improvements 
in service quality. In transport and logistics, there is generally greater trade freedom in 
countries that have implemented or are developing competition laws. In contrast, in sea 
freight, Malaysia, which is considering whether to introduce competition legislation, 
rates better than Singapore and Indonesia, both of which have competition laws in force, 
reflecting its less concentrated market and more room to expand capacity.
  The overall conclusion for the case study sectors is as signalled earlier for ease of 
economic activity more generally — that there is a high but not perfect correlation between 
competition laws and market conditions and outcomes. Competition laws generally make 
a significant positive contribution, but are not the sole determinant of how well markets 
behave and perform. Other influences can compensate for less developed competition 
Table	9:	Cross-country	comparisons
  Indonesia  Singapore  Thailand  Vietnam  Malaysia  Philippines  Brunei  Cambodia  Laos  Myanmar 
              Darussalam
Status of  
competition 
laws  √√	 √√	 √√	 √√	 √	 √  x  x  x  x 
Ease of  
economic  
activity  √	 √√√	 √√	 √	 √√	 √	 √  x  x  x 
Cement                     
Market  
concentration  x    x      x         
Excess  
capacity  x    √	 	 	 √√	        
Barriers to  
entry  √    x      √         
Output and 
 prices  √	 	 √√	     x         
Telecommuni	
cations                     
Market  
concentration    √	 √	 	 	 	 √√     
Barriers to  
entry      x  x        √     
Output      √√	 √√	 	 	 	 √√     
Prices      x  √√	 	 	 	 √√     
Transport		
and	logistics                     
Trade freedom √√	 √√√	 √	 √	 √√	 √√	 √√  x  x   
Sea freight  √	 √√	 	 	 √√√         
Source:  NZIER54
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laws or detract from more developed competition laws. The implication for policy makers 
is that developing, implementing and enforcing competition laws may not be sufficient 
to achieve competitive market conditions and outcomes in all sectors, nor necessary for 
some sectors, but can generally be expected to be significantly conducive. 55
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